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ANTI-SOCIAL EXERCISE OF RIGHTS
One of the most important characteristics of the new stage
of socialization of the law, which has definitely begun in England and into which we are somewhat tardily and hesitatingly
entering in this country, is the development of prohibitions upon
the anti-social exercise of legal rights. The most conspicuous of
the rights thus limited are connected with property, but the general conception is broader. The idea is that the law should not
permit the exercise of any rights which it gives (whether or not
these are property rights) in a manner which will not be conducive to the social benefit.
This development has a close parallelism to the basic ideas
of the last stage of liberalism in our law-that of equity and
natural law. In both stages the idea of limitation of the use of
legal rights is prominent. But the limitation upon which courts
of equity have insisted is a moral one, that is they restrained an
unjust and unconscientious use of legal rights. At the present
time the courts do not consider so much the morality of the defendant-if his action is deemed to be anti-social it may be restrained even though his morality may be beyond criticism.
But even this difference is one more of standpoint and
method than of result. As will presently appear, many antisocial exercises of rights are the result of, or at least accompanied by, a spiteful motive on the part of the actor. And this
shows that the action of the courts of equity in restraining unconscientious action was really based upon the motive of protecting society. The law has always been, and in the nature of
things always must be, merely an agency of social control, and
has its sole function in the effectuation of the social purposes.
This fact has always had a certain recognition by those who have
formed the law, though that recognition may sometimes have
been almost unconscious.
That there may be such a thing as an anti-social exercise
of a right given by the law is entirely obvious, but what is not
so obvious is the proposition that the law, which has given the
(339)
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right, may restrain its exercise. There is certainly a logical contradiction here, and perhaps it is even more than logical.
There is no doubt that the civil law recognizes liability for
improper-basically, anti-social--exercise of legal rights. The
French are accustomed to call this "The Abuse of a Right." The
theoretical justification which civilian writers give for this result is, therefore, of interest to us.
In Germany, the legislative body has cut the Gordian knot
by enacting that:
"The exertion of a right is not permissible if it can
have no other purpose than to damage another." 1
Accordingly, it has not been necessary for the Ger--. w"ters to give much attention to justifying this result in theory. The
very existence of this statute is, however, a strong practical justification of the rule that liability should be imposed for intentionally injurious and perhaps other anti-social exercises of a
right, since, at least in this one case, the practical sense of the
legislators was that the law should interfere.
In France, the same result has been reached by the courts
without the aid of any specific provision in the Code. So it is
not surprizing to find much consideration of the matter by the
French jurists.
Perhaps the most complete consideration of this matter of
"L'Abus de Droit" is in a doctoral thesis with that title, written
by Porcherot.2 The learned author considers the matter at
length and not only reaches the conclusion that the principle of
liability for the abuse of a right is well settled in the French
law, but points out that liability has been enforced in several different classes of cases, as follows: (i) where the abuse resulted
from an intention to injure; (2) where it resulted from a lack
of proper interest; (3) where it resulted from the absence of
a legitimate motive; and (4) where it was outside the social
and economic end of the right exercised. It may be that these
'German Civil Code of I896, SeC. 226 (Loewy's translation).
2 University of Dijon (igol).
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classes are, to some extent, overlapping, but it is clear that they
go farther than merely imposing liability for an act from an
improper motive. Indeed, if Porcherot's analysis is correct, it
seems clear that the French law goes to the extent of imposing
liability for practically any exercise of a right where the consequences are clearly anti-social.
A thesis published two years later at the University of Paris
by Salanson takes a somewhat narrower view. It is there suggested that where the defendant acts in accordance with his legal
rights no liability can be imposed unless the injury was intentional. Even this is not quite the same as confining the liability
to cases where the motive of the defendant was spiteful, but
perhaps it comes to much the same thing. At any rate, Salanson concedes that a somewhat larger scope for this principle of
liability is socially desirable, but maintains that it would be better to have these situations specifically defined by statute. Even
if he is right, his suggestion of the statutory method of defining
the situation has not so much force in common law countries.
A vigorous attack upon this whole conception of the abuse
of a right is made by Professor Planiol (of the University of
Paris) . 3 Part of his difficulty, as is quite frequently the case
with French writers on the subject, comes from the ambiguity of
the word "droit," which means both "right" and "law."
From
this verbal ambiguity we who use the English language are largely
free, though this has unfortunately not prevented many of our
jurists from falling into the same confusion of thought, and thus
failing to distinguish rules of law from the rights which the
rules are intended to effectuate.
But Planiol's attack upon the conception of the abuse of a
right goes much deeper than this, and is put upon grounds where
a satisfactory, or at least logical answer seems difficult. If I have
a right, he says, I cannot abuse it, or at least I cannot be held
liable for exercising it to the limit. He is even prepared to carry
this argument to the logical conclusion that a person should not
be held even when he acted from a bad motive, but he admits
' Traite elementaire du droit civil, secs. 870-872.
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that the German Code and some French decisions do impose
such liability. In fact the German Code goes rather farther, and
so apparently do several French decisions.
But the theoretical justification of the rule imposing liability for an abuse of a right is not left entirely to students. It has
professorial support from Charmont, a member of the faculty
of the University of Montpellier, in an article in the Revue
trimestrielle du droit. 4 This article is a review of the thesis of
Porcherot and also of a thesis by one of the author's pupils at
Montpellier on the same subject. Charmont admits that the doctrine of abuse of a right seems logically a contradiction in terms.
But he points out that the phase has had a large and growing use
(which proves that the idea it expresses possesses real utility
in the law) and that this reflects the fact that the law is following
more closely on morals. This is very much in line with Dean
Roscoe Pound's contention that the attack, based upon logical
grounds, on the idea of liability for an abuse of a right, is really
an afterthought. The restriction is concededly accomplished to
some extent, and all that is shown by the argument is that the
reasons given for this result are logically insufficient. The analytical jurist may insist (and no doubt his insistence is conducive
to clearness of thought) that there is no abuse of a right but
rather that the right itself is being cut down from the broad scope
in terms of which it was previously expressed. The result-that
the law will not generally permit anti-social action-is clear, no
matter how it may be expressed.
Charmont seems to favor a subjective test, that is, a consideration of the defendant's motives. He admits, however, the
practical difficulty in applying this test, since the defendant is not
likely to state that he acts solely from malevolent motives. Recourse must then be had to a consideration of the objective facts,
which may show pretty clearly that the defendant could have
no possible motive other than spitefulness. It will be noted that
this is the precise test laid down in the German Code. 5
'Vol.

1, p. 113.

'Supra, note I.
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Another discussion of this matter is the article by Professor
Walton of McGill University, Montreal, Canada. 6 He demonstrates quite conclusively that the law of France and of the Province of Quebec imposes liability for the abuse of a right, particularly for malevolent action. He also points out that the liability is not confined to matters connected with the use of property, but includes such things as the control of one's family, the
bringing of suits, etc.
Professor Walton also considers the situation with respect
to this liability in the common law. He admits that it is constantly stated by the English and American courts that the motive of the defendant is wholly immaterial and will not of itself impose any liability. But on this point the author is somewhat doubtful and cites an article by Dean Ames 7 as proving
that our law does in fact sometimes impose liability with respect
to an act otherwise legal because of the spiteful or malevolent
motive of the actor.
Dean Ames' article is concerned with the question as stated
in its title, "How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the
Wrongful Motive of the Actor."
He insists that liability is
sometimes imposed by our law merely because of the defendant's
malevolence. This will generally not be so if the plaintiff is
suffering from the consequences of his own breach of duty, and
of course there is no liability where there is "absolute privilege."
In the case of use of the defendant's land solely to injure the
plaintiff, the weight of authority is against liability, but there is
a growing tendency to enforce it, and there are a number of statutes to this effect. Both of these tendencies have grown stronger
since Dean Ames wrote. But even then he was able to cite malicious prosecution cases, cases of qualified privilege, and cases
of injury to third persons by pressure on an employer or his
employees, as indubitable examples of situations where the law
reaches a different result according to the motives of the defendant.
. 22
7 18

Harv. L. R. 5oi.
Harv. L. R. 411.
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Even as respects property, liability is not entirely confined to
spiteful and malevolent injury to others. For example, it is well
settled, at least in America, that only reasonable use of percolating waters will be allowed.8 It seems clear that a purely malicious
use cannot be reasonable, although a reasonable and so legally
defensible use made be made although the defendant has malevolent motives. But though the defendant's'motives were unexceptionable, he will be held liable for a use on his own land of
percolating waters which is found to be unreasonable. So again
the ultimate test is whether or not the defendant's act is socially
desirable, although in determining this question his motives are
a very important consideration. 9
The whole question of the effect of the defendant's motives
upon his liability for an act injurious to the plaintiff was elaborately considered in Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co.1 ° Here the
plaintiff's assignor, the Crystal Oil Company, a retailer of oil in
the city of Des Moines, had been accustomed to buy its supplies
of oil from the defendant, a refiner and wholesaler. The Crystal
Company supplied its customers with cards to be displayed when
oil was wanted, in the manner usual in the distribution of ice,
and in fact did distribute its oil from tank wagons in the method
used by ice dealers. When the Crystal Company stopped buying from the defendant, the latter instituted a similar method of
distributing its own oil but concealed from the customers of the
Crystal Company that it was so doing and endeavored to cause
them to believe that they were dealing with that company. In
fact, the defendant's drivers were instructed to try to make all
deliveries at places where the Crystal cards were displayed, and
many of the cards were removed and destroyed by them. By
this means the Crystal Company was driven out of business.
This suit was brought for damages sustained through this action
'See "Percolating Waters: The Rule of Reasonable User," by E. W. Huffcutt, 13 Yale L. J. 222.
'See also, Wigmore, Cases on Torts, App. A, sec. 262, 271-272.
.0152 Ia. 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911).
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of the defendant, which, it may be noted, had withdrawn from
the retail business as soon as the Crystal Company had been
driven out.
A verdict for the plaintiff in the lower court was reversed
by the state Supreme Court on a technicality, but most of the
opinion was devoted to a discussion of the case on the merits. As
to this, the court was strongly in favor of the plaintiff. The
court insisted that the action of the defendant was not justified
by competition, since the Crystal Company was a retailer, and
the defendant was not. As to this the court said:
"We may concede to the appellants the undoubted right
to establish a retail oil business in Des Moines . . . ; but
in so doing it was bound to conduct such business with reasonable regard and consideration for the equal right of the
Crystal Company to continue its business and to continue
supplying oil to such of its customers as desired to remainwith it. If, however, there was no real purpose or desire
to establish a competing business, but under the guise or
pretense of competition, to accomplish a malicious purpose to
ruin the Crystal Company or drive it out of business, intending themselves to retire therefrom when their end had
been secured, then they can claim no immunity under the
rules of law which recognize and protect competition between dealers in the same line of business seeking in good
faith the patronage of the same people. And if, under such
pretense of competition, defendants maliciously interfered
with the business of the Crystal Oil Company in the manner charged, and injury to the latter was thereby inflicted,
a right of action exists for the recovery of damages. It
may be conceded that authorities are not wanting to sustain the position that, even though the Standard Oil Company had no intention of becoming a retail dealer in oil in
Des Moines, but entered the business of selling oil in this
manner temporarily, for the sole purpose of driving the
Crystal Company out, it is a matter into which the courts
will not inquire; but we think such precedents are out of
harmony with fundamental principles of justice, ...
, as
well as out of harmony with the later and better considered

cases." 11
11152 Ia. 626.
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The case is therefore a strong authority for the proposition
that a purely malevolent motive may impose liability for acts
otherwise justifiable. On the other hand, it may be seriously
questoned whether the action of the defendant in this case was
really purely spiteful in motive. It no doubt thought that it was
acting to further its own business interests, since, though it did
not care to engage permanently in the retail business in Des
Moines, it wanted to compel all retailers of oil in that city to
purchase their oil from it. But perhaps this criticism only
strengthens the authority of the case for our present purposes,
since we then have a case imposing liability for anti-social methods of carrying out such a well-protected legal right as that of
competition. But the authority of the case on this point is certainly weakened by the fact that the deceptive methods of the
defendant, particularly with reference to the cards, pretty clearly
fell within the accepted category of unfair competition.
As has been said, the general tendency of the authorities is
not to confine liability to malevolent acts, but undoubtedly these
acts are the ones which are most often, or at least most clearly
anti-social. Perhaps this may be best shown by looking at the situation from the point of view of the injured person. Any intentional injury to him is prima facie unjustifiable. But such injury may be justified because inflicted in pursuance of a legal
right given because of a counter-vailing interest of society. The
obvious example of this is competition, which is of such large
benefit to society as a whole, that injury to individuals, though
itself socially undesirable, may have to be borne in its behalf.
But if the motive of the actor is purely spiteful, there is no justification. Society has no interest in permitting individuals to
wreak their spite-or at least none which is in anywise comparable with the social interest in the physical and moral well-being
of the injured individual. The cases denying liability for purely
malevolent acts belong, therefore, to a past era of social thinking,
appropriate only in a pioneer society.' 2
1 See Stoner, "The Influence of Social and Economic Ideas on the Law of
Malicious Torts," 8 Mich. L. R. 468.
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The influence of the broader point of view of the law is not
confined to restrictions on the use of property, but certain of
these restrictions are of especial importance at the present time.
Among these are billboard restrictions and zoning. There is still
vigorous debate, particularly in America, as to the desirability
and validity of such restrictions, so that some consideration of
these matters is pertinent here.
In England the matter of billboard regulation is settled by
a statute 13 permitting any local authorities to make by-laws,
"For regulating, restricting, or preventing the exhibition of advertisements in such manner, or by such means, as
to affect injuriously the amenities of a public park or pleasure promenade, or to disfigure the natural beauty of a landscape."
Such a statute goes rather farther than those thus far made
in this country, where billboard regulation has mostly been confined to cities-though many people are devoutly hoping for further restrictions of advertisements on highways. Unfortunately
the English act cannot be cited as a complete justification for our
even less radical (and therefore less adequate) billboard regulations, since they are not blessed with-or, if you will, hampered
by-written constitutions. Nevertheless, it has not ordinarily
been considered that the law of England is particularly remiss
in the protection of individual rights, and so a restriction of such
rights in that country is, prima facie at least, a justifiable one
from the standpoint of society.
However, the constitutional question must be faced in America. Perhaps it is largely a fake question, as Professor Terry
insists. 1 4 But even he admits that wholly unreasonable restrictions on the use of one's own property cannot be upheld. Is the
restriction against billboards reasonable?
'Advertisement
"Constitutionality
24 Yale L. J. i.

Regulations Act (19o7), VII Ed. 7, ch. 27.
of Statutes Forbidding Advertising Signs on Property,
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There are not wanting authorities that answer this question
in the negative. 1 These cases seem to be based principally on
the reasoning that such restrictions are imposed purely on aesthetic grounds, and that such considerations alone furnish no
justification for depriving a man of the use of his property.
It must be admitted that aesthetic grounds are one of the
principal motives in such legislation. 16 Nevertheless most courts
have found other reasons for upholding such restrictions. A
rather full discussion of the matter will be found in St. Louis
Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 7 upholding a St. Louis
billboard ordinance, which was also upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.' 8 The ordinance did not wholly prohibit billboards anywhere in the city but made rather drastic requirements
as to their construction, especially that they should not be nearer
than six feet to any building and not nearer the street line than
fifteen feet.
The opinion of the Missouri court begins with rather broad
language (with which, however, most persons except those in
the billboard business would probably agree) as to the social undesirability of billboards, particularly from the aesthetic standpoint. But it is pointed out that there are other and even more
fundamental justifications for frowning on billboards. They
are menaces to the public safety, because of the danger of their
falling down and also because of their highly inflammable nature; to the public health because the spaces behind them are apt
to be used as privies and because much rubbish is blown by the
wind and collected there; and to the public morals because furnishing a screen frequently availed of for immoral practices. The
court meets the argument that non-advertising structures may
possibly have all these dangers, by pointing out that they are not
in fact so used to any considerable extent-a realistic point of
view which is only too rare in the opinions of our courts.
'Bill Posting Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 72, 58 Atl. 342 (1904);
Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 6i Atl. 894 (1905).
" See Chicago City Club Bulletin, Vol. V, no. 24.
17235
Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929 (1911).
'St. Louis Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274
(919).
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These reasons are certainly sufficient to uphold billboard restrictions under as narrow interpretations of the scope of the
police power as has ever generally prevailed in this country, with
all its worship of property rights. But it is rather difficult to
contend that the aesthetic motive is not a strong and sometimes
a decisive one in billboard legislation. This is especially clear
1
in the Chicago ordinance upheld in Thomas Cusack v. Chicago."
The reasoning of the court is similar to that in the Missouri case,
and it was held that billboards might be restricted or even prohibited as nuisances. The difficulty was that the ordinance forbade the erection of billboards in residence districts, but permitted
them if consented to in writing by the owners of a majority of
the frontage in the block. Now it can hardly be supposed that
a majority of property owners can legalize a real nuisance; if
the reason for the prohibition of billboards is because of their
danger to safety, health, and morals, a single resident of the dis-trict is entitled to block them, though all the others desire them.
It must follow that all the cases sustaining billboard restrictions in this country-and they constitute the great weight
of authority-are really authorities that the use of property may
be restricted for aesthetic reasons. As will presently appear, this
is important in connection with zoning, though it need not be discussed here, since the courts have managed to dodge the point
in billboard cases.
We may now turn to the authorities on zoning. This goes
much farther than the restriction of billboards, though it rests
on very similar principles. Such a case as People v. Oak Park 20
is perhaps a good one to mark the transition, since it has elements
of both billboard and zoning cases. Here a village ordinance
prohibited the erection of a public garage on any site where twothirds of the buildings within a radius of 500 feet were used for
residences, without the written consent of the majority of the
property owners (according to frontage) within this radius. The
ordinance was sustained on principles analogous to those of billboard cases. There is a close resemblance in that the particular
U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 19o (I917).
266 Ill. 365, IO7 N. E. 636 (1914).

'°242
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type of structure was objectionable, but also a distinct difference
in that a garage is not of itself a nuisance, nor is it likely to be
used for improper purposes. The objections to it come from
certain features, especially ugliness, noise, and danger to children,
which are inseparable from its use. These are matters which
touch on the fundamental principles of zoning, since no one
would contend that a public garage is undesirable per se; in fact
it is a necessary business. In a residence district it is still a good
thing, but in the wrong place. And so perhaps, but much less
clearly, is a billboard. On the whole, then, the basic principles
are not very different.
But zoning goes much farther because the whole community
is divided up, and from some of these divisions, not merely various kinds of lawful business but also some residential buildingsapartment houses, and sometimes even two-family houses-are
excluded. This is certainly a very radical limitation upon the
use of property, and the most socially-minded jurists would have
to concede that such restrictions need pretty clear justification.
Nevertheless, the basic principle of zoning is now generally
upheld in this country. That does not mean that any possible
zoning arrangement will be upheld, for they must be reasonable,
and the question of reasonableness is a judicial question under
our bills of rights. But the basic principle of zoning is generally
upheld, as not contravening the constitutional rights of property
owners. Most important of all, it has been upheld under the
federal Constitution in the leading case of Euclid v. Ambler
21
Realty Co.

This case, decided in 1926, probably furnished a surprise
to most lawyers. That the court reached such an unexpectedly
sensible result should, no doubt, protect it from a hyper-critical
consideration of the grounds of its opinion; but one cannot forbear from pointing out that the opinion is based chiefly upon
analogies of the law of nuisance; and for reasons that will presently appear, zoning cannot be adequately rested on this ground.
The social desirability of zoning can hardly be questioned.
It is conducive to public safety by lessening traffic in residence,
'272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
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and particularly one-family residence, districts. And it is conducive to public health and comfort by keeping from business
districts the noise and other unpleasant features which cannot be
avoided in carrying on many kinds of business, but which are
riot even objectionable in a factory district. But it cannot be
denied that the most important purpose in most zoning is to improve the appearance of the residential districts. Hence, we must
now face the question whether a restriction on the use of property, which restriction is dictated by aesthetic purposes, can be
justified.
On theory, it seems that the question should be answered in
the affirmative.2 2 Property is a social institution and should not
be permitted to be used for anti-social ends. With the advance
of civilization, ugliness is just as bad as noise or malodorousness;
it should therefore be restrained in the social interest, just as they
are.
This argument, it will be noted, is directly in line with the
present development of the law toward restraining the anti-social
exercise of property and other rights. Some authorities go even
farther, as, for instance, Jenks, who says:
"It is probable that we shall eventually make provisions that the houses along certain residence streets shall
conform to the artistic sense of the community as expressed
by the building inspectors." 23
It is hardly likely that the courts would as yet permit quite
such vigorous restrictions, but we may come to them sometime.
And why not? There is noth ing uglier than a building of a bad
or unsuitable type of architecture.
Even yet, most courts are unwilling to rest zoning upon aesthetic reasons alone. They manage to find other reasons, and at
the most say that aesthetics may properly be considered along
with these other things. On the other hand, those courts which
still oppose the basic principles of zoning, usually do so under
'See note by T. P. Hardman, "The Social Interest in the Aesthetic and
the Socialization of Law," 29 W. Va. L. Q. x95.
. Governmental Action for Social Welfare, p. 8.
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the theory that zoning is for aesthetic reasons, and that such reasons alone do not justify the denial to a man of the right to use
his property as he wishes.
Typical of this line of cases is Piper v. Ekern,2 holding unconstitutional a statute restricting the height of buildings around
the square in Madison, Wisconsin, where the state capitol was
built. The purpose of the statute was ostensibly to protect the
state capitol from fire, but the court quite effectively exposed the
speciousness of this reason by showing that none of the buildings
were very near the capitol and also that the capitol was practically fireproof. The majority then seems right in its contention
that the statute was passed for mainly aesthetic reasons. Not so
sound is its contention that the statute was passed from purely
selfish motives, and that "The state owns this property as any
private citizen owns property." One wonders what the court
would say to a statute providing for the use of the state capitol
as a warehouse, or as an apartment house for the use of the members of the legislature. If we must talk in terms of selfish interests, this was a case of the selfish interest of all the people not
merely of the community but of the whole state, as against the
at least equally selfish interests of a few property owners-and
the court decided in favor of the latter!
The dissenting opinion in this case admits that the statute
must be sustained, if at all, on aesthetic grounds, but contends
that these are sufficient. The following very suggestive language
is used:
"There is no reason why a judge should painfully bow
his back over a lawn-mower to beautify his front yard, and
then take pen in hand and deny the use and sense of the
thing." 2This suggests a more realistic approach to the problem of
aesthetics as justifying restrictions on the use of property. Let
us admit, for the sake of argument, that there is no justification
for restricting the use of property, except such as fall within
i8o Wis. 586, I94 N. W. I59 (1923).
14
i8o Wis. 6o4.
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the rather ancient category of the police power. But this certainly includes the preservation of general values in the community. Then we are reduced to the rather simple question whether
the appearance of the locality has anything to do with the value
of property. It does not require a skilled realtor to answer this
question; as is suggested in the above quotation, even a judge
knows the answer perfectly well, when he does not intentionally
blind himself to what he knows in his non-judicial capacity, as
is an unfortunate habit of many of our jurists when writing
opinions. In short, aesthetic reasons are sufficient to justify
reasonable restrictions on the use of property, if for no other
reason, because beauty is worth money.
If the courts are slow in recognizing this, yet most of them
are coming to see that aesthetic considerations may properly be
given some weight. A very able opinion to this effect is Windsor
v. Whitney, 26 which upholds an ordinance of Windsor prohibiting the laying out of new streets without the approval of the
town plan commission, which, as a condition of its approval, was
to establish a set-back line for buildings. The court conceded
that the purpose of this ordinance, and especially of the set-back
line, was largely, though not exclusively, the beautification of the
27
town, but found it none the worse on that account.
But there are still several unsettled questions with respect
to zoning, which may be briefly considered here. They have
all one common factor, that they cannot be satisfactorily solved
by treating the subject of zoning under the category of preventing nuisances.
The first of these questions is as to whether an owner of
property the use of which is restricted by this arrangement is
entitled to compensation for the consequent reduced value of his
property. As already shown, the effect of proper zoning is to
raise the value of property as a whole, but it may happen-in
fact it always does happen where litigation is begun-that this
Conn. 357, iii Atl. 354 (192o).
See also, to the same effect, Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 127
N. E. 525 (92o), approving a statute which would authorize cities and towns
to zone, and explicitly authorized them to take measures for the beautification of
295

the community.
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particular owner could make more money by a prohibited use
of the property.
If this prohibited use constitutes a nuisance in the usual
sense, there can of course be no compensation to the owner. And
this looks reasonable, since this particular owner is generally
seeking to profit at the expense of his neighbors, whose property
will be depressed in value as much as his is increased. But to
call an apartment house a nuisance is an obvious absurdity.
The matter was considered at length by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in State v. Houghton.28 Unfortunately, the court
unconsciously begged the real question, since it constantly assumed that if the zoning statute in question was valid, compensation must be given for the restriction of use-here that of
apartment houses. The court expressed the question as whether
this was condemnation for a public use, whereas the actual question was as to the basic soundness of zoning. On the first hearing the court invalidated the statute, which, it held, provided for
condemnation for a private use; on rehearing, one judge changed
his vote, and it was held that the statute was enforceable, but that
compensation must be given. The opinion on rehearing is an
excellent justification of zoning, but does not really consider the
question of the necessity of paying compensation.
This question depends, of course, upon whether there is a
sufficient taking of the property by the public as distinguished
from a mere regulation of its use. This is the most usual method
of expressing the matter by the courts, but it is of little help
in drawing the line between these two very nebulous concepts.
Perhaps it may help us to do this if we remember that zoning
restrictions are not incumbrances on property, any more than
are restrictions against actual nuisances.29 It must follow that
they are usually merely regulatory, and this is especially clear
if they are somewhat general in operation, and not confined to
the property of the individual asking compensation. This is
usually the case, so it would seem that, as a general rule, propS144 Minn. I, 174 N. W. 885, 176 N. W. 159 (i9i9,
I92O).
'Linscoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corporation, 229 N. Y. 313, 128

N. E. 29

(i92o).
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erty owners are not entitled to compensation for any losses
which they may sustain as a result of zoning restrictions. This
result seems sound, as zoning is a movement in the public interest, and each property owner should in the same interest bear
such slight private losses as may fall on him thereby.
Another question as yet not much mooted is the effect of
zoning restrictions on existing buildings which do not comply
with the zoning requirements. If these buildings are nuisances,
they must be removed, as all nuisances must be abated without
compensation. But it is questionable whether any court would
permit such drastic action. It is true that in People v. Oak
Park'30 the court construed the ordinance there in question as
referring to existing garages, and stated that as so construed the
ordinance was unobjectionable. It was admitted, however, that
no attempt had been made to enforce the ordinance against existing garages.
It is submitted that the owners of existing buildings cannot reasonably be compelled to tear them down-unless perhaps
when the building was erected on the eve of the enactment of
the ordinance, and with a fraudulent purpose. At any rate, practically all ordinances are so drawn as not to affect existing buildings. On the other hand, it is clear that existing buildings cannot be enlarged, and this notwithstanding the fact that the restriction may result in their becoming useless for the owner's
business. 3 ' Difficult questions may thus arise as to partly completed buildings, and repairs to existing buildings, but perhaps
help in the solution of these problems may be found from the
authorities respecting existing wooden buildings in newly-established city fire limits.
Still another problem may arise as to the effect of permitting
adjoining property owners to sanction what would otherwise
be a violation of the zoning ordinance. It would seem that such
a provision would be unobjectionable, since zoning restrictions
are primarily for the benefit of the nearby owners. Yet if this
, Supra, note 2o.
'State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 96 N. W. 451 (I923); American Wood
Products Co. v. Minneapolis, 35 F. (2d) 657 (1929).
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is really a case of nuisance it would seem improper to allow it
against the protest of a single person who would be injured. The
United States Supreme Court has taken a rather peculiar position on this matter. After holding in the Cusack case,32 that
adjoining property owners could permit billboards although they
are nuisances, it has lately held 3 that a provision permitting a
deviation from zoning rules by written consent of the owners
of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet, was itself invalid
and invalidated the whole ordinance, because the violation of a
zoning restriction is not a nuisance. While it is gratifying to
have the court abandon its unsound nuisance conception of zoning restrictions, the result seems a rather curious inversion of
the natural and sensible rules. There are many authorities that
such permission cannot be given to adjoining owners, but they
seem unsound. Furthermore, the position of the courts that such
a provision invalidates the whole ordinance seems doubly unfortunate; why cannot it be stricken out, and the ordinance stand
as a whole?
Still another difficulty in applying the nuisance theory to
justify zoning is the fact of the constant changes which have to
be made in districts. This is an unfortunate necessity because
such changes are often the result of personal or political influence, and often unjustifiably injure persons who have bought
property relying on the districts as originally established. Yet
it would be still worse to have a rule that districts could not be
changed, as changes of conditions may make zoning regulations
not merely useless but positively harmful. But in this scheme,
a conception of zoning regulations as preventing nuisances is
absurd and unworkable. Zoning must be recognized as perhaps
analogous to, but certainly having an enormously broader scope
than the common law conception of restraining nuisances.
Restrictions on billboards and zoning regulations are in the
broad view merely prominent examples of the increasing limitations on the use of property which are characteristic of our
time. And these limitations on the use of property are thema Supra, note 19.

Washington v. Roberge, 278 U. S. i16, 49 Sul. Ct. 50 (928).

ANTI-SOCIAL EXERCISE OF RIGHTS

357

selves the most important phase of a more general movement to
restrain the anti-social exercise of rights. Rights are given by
the law to individuals for social purposes, because the law, being
a social institution, acts, or should act, solely for the furtherance
of the social welfare. If, then, a right given by the law is being
used by its possessor consciously or unconsciously for anti-social
ends, the very purpose for which it was given is defeated, and
the law can and should interfere to prevent such a perversion
of the right. Today there is a growing recognition of this duty,
which is itself the result of an increasing understanding that the
legal order must be further socialized. To the furtherance of
this result, it is the duty of all persons concerned with the shaping of the legal order, whether as writers, teachers, advocates,
or judges, to lend their best efforts.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Cambridge, Mass.

